Rank-Dependent Measures of Bi-Polarization and Marginal Tax Reforms by Paul Makdissi & Stéphane Mussard
 
« Rank-Dependent Measures of Bi-
Polarization and Marginal Tax Reforms » 
   
   
   P a u l   M A K D I S S I  
   Stéphane  MUSSARD 
 
DR n°2009-29 





Lameta, Université Montpellier I
Dcember 2009
Abstract
In this paper, we investigate a dual class of bi-polarization indices, namely rank-
dependent bi-polarization indices. We show that these indices may be characterized
with the generalized positional transfer sensitivity property. We ﬁnd necessary and
suﬃcient conditions in order to identify bi-polarization-reducing marginal tax reforms.
Precisely, we propose inverse positional dominance criteria based on the comparison of
bi-polarization concentration curves. An illustration is presented using the Jordanian
Household Expenditure and Income Survey 2002/2003.
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11 Introduction
The late Professor Berrebi has dedicated an important part of his academic career studying
income inequality. Although the concept of polarization started to appear in the economic
literature in the 1990’s, pioneer works of Berrebi and Silber (1988) related to distances be-
tween income distributions and mainly Berrebi and Silber (1989) on the ﬂatness of income
distributions have been shown to be related with measures of bi-polarization, bi-polarization
being an index of dispersion between a variable (say income) and a central tendency such as
the median (refer e.g. to Silber, Deutsch and Hanoka, 2007). Since then, the literature has
provided many analyzes of income polarization (see Esteban and Ray, 1994, Wolfson, 1994
and 1997, Wang and Tsui, 2000 and Duclos, Esteban and Ray, 2004 among others). Re-
ferring to Chakravarty et al. (2007), which proposed absolute measures of bi-polarization,
we introduce a general class of rank-dependent absolute bi-polarization indices. One in-
teresting aspect pointed out in the paper is the analysis of the impact of public policies
on bi-polarization. Precisely, we propose a method to identify bi-polarization reducing tax
reforms.
In their seminal investigations, Yitzhaki and Slemrod (1991) have highlighted the con-
struction of welfare-improving indirect tax reforms for all social welfare functions respecting
the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. They show that this mechanism can be addressed by
checking for non-intersecting concentration curves. Makdissi and Mussard (2008a, 2008b)
have extended this work by deﬁning higher order of concentration curves that are linked to
positional transfer principles. In this paper, we extend our previous work by characterizing
similar generalized transfer principles in the context of rank dependent bi-polarization. We
then present the concept of bi-polarization concentration curves and show how they can be
used to identify polarization-reducing indirect tax reforms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follow. The next Section presents the mathe-
matical notations. In Section 3, we develop well-known transfer principles for bi-polarization
measurement and characterize the bi-polarization indices with respect to these principles.
Section 4 is devoted to the deﬁnitions of bi-polarization concentration curves and how they
can be used to identify bi-polarization-reducing indirect tax reforms. Section 5 provides an
illustration based on the Jordanian Household Expenditure and Income Survey 2002/2003.
2 Notations
Let us deﬁne the environment on which we intend to obtain bi-polarization-reducing tax
reforms. On the one hand, we consider the following absolute rank-dependent bi-polarization




|Φ(p) − Φ(0.5)|v (p)dp (1)







is the left inverse continuous c.d.f. (cumulative distri-
bution function), yE the equivalent income, F
 
yE
the c.d.f. of equivalent incomes, and
v (p) ≥ 0 the frequency distortion function weighting an individual at the p-th percentile of
the distribution. The concept of equivalent incomes yE has been introduced by King (1983).
To account for the eﬀect of diﬀerent prices across households/individuals, King (1983) uses
the utility function of a reference household as a basis for deﬁning equivalent incomes. Let
U` (y`,q`,t) represent the indirect utility of household `, endowed with exogenous income
y`, when facing prices q` and tax system t. Next, consider a reference household R that
faces prices qR. Accordingly, King (1983) deﬁnes the equivalent income by the exogenous
income y`,t that would allow the reference household facing prices qR and tax system t to
reach utility U` (y`,q`,t):
UR (y`,t,qR,t) = U` (y`,q`,t). (2)
Thus, if t1 and t2 denote the pre-reform and post-reform tax systems then y`,t2 − y`,t1 can
be considered as a money measure of the welfare change for household ` of changing the tax
system from t1 to t2.
Without loss of generality, we can restrict our attention to the class of bi-polarization
functions for which v (p) ≥ 0 for all p ∈ [0,1]. In this respect, if R+ denotes the set of










v−(p) ≥ 0 is continuous and diﬀerentiable
almost everywhere ∀p ∈ [0,0.5[
v+(p) ≥ 0 is continuous and diﬀerentiable








(Φ(0.5) − Φ(p))v− (p)dp +
Z 1
0.5
(Φ(p) − Φ(0.5))v+ (p)dp
=: P−(Φ) + P+(Φ). (3)
In the sequel, a function such as v, an income y` or an income distribution y will be indexed
either by − or by + in order to deﬁne it either for all p ∈ [0,0.5[ or for all p ∈]0.5,1],
respectively, that is, on the left-hand side of the median or on the right-hand side.1
1Note that for the derivatives of v(·) below, we will exclude p = 0.5 since the absolute value is continuous
on [0,1] but not derivable at 0.5.
33 Transfer Principles and Characterization
All indices in Ω1 are said to satisfy Pen’s (1971) Parade principle. It is worth mentioning
that Pen’s parade is usually concerned with the comparison of (inverse) c.d.f. only. An
absolute parade is then provided.2 Just note that the parade has to be made either before
or after the median (or both):
Principle 3.1 Pen’s Parade (1971). If the curve ΦA (0.5) − ΦA (p) =: C−
A(p) for all
p ∈ [0,0.5] lies nowhere below the following ΦB (0.5) − ΦB (p) =: C−
B(p) for all p ∈ [0,0.5],
that is, C−
A(p) weakly dominates C−
B(p), and/or if ΦA (p) − ΦA (0.5) =: C+
A(p) for all
p ∈ [0.5,1] lies nowhere below ΦB (p)−ΦB (0.5) =: C+
B(p) for all p ∈ [0.5,1], that is, C+
A(p)
weakly dominates C+
B(p), then P (ΦA) ≥ P(ΦB).





+ (·) be the `-th derivative of the v (·) function on [0,0.5[ and ]0.5,1] respectively,
with v(0) (·) being the function itself. Accordingly, we restrict our attention to the following
class of bi-polarization functions that satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfer (Pigou
(1912) and Dalton (1920)):
Principle 3.2 Pigou-Dalton (PD). An income distribution e y− (e y+), whose left inverse
cumulative distribution function is e Φ− (e Φ+), is obtained from the distribution y− (y+) of left
inverse c.d.f. Φ− (Φ+) by a progressive Pigou-Dalton transfer on the left-hand side (right-
hand side) of the median if a transfer of amount δ > 0 occurs from y−
i (y+











j + δ ≤ y−
j+1 (y+
i−1 ≤ y+
i − δ, y+
j + δ ≤ y+
j+1).
A bi-polarization index weakly satisﬁes (PD) if
P−(e Φ−) ≥ P−(Φ−) , P+(e Φ−) ≥ P+(Φ−) , P(e Φ) ≥ P(Φ) ,
(ı) when either the transfer occurs on the left-hand side of the median only ;
(ıı) or the transfer occurs on the right-hand side of the median only ;
(ııı) or both transfers occur (on the left and on the right), respectively.
Lemma 3.1 For all P (Φ) ∈ Ω1, if P (Φ) weakly satisﬁes (PD), then:
(ı) v
(1)
− (p) ≥ 0 for all p ∈ [0,0.5[
(ıı) v
(1)
+ (p) ≤ 0 for all p ∈]0.5,1].
2Note that in the literature, absolute Lorenz ordering is related to distributions with equal means in
order to compare distributions with same mean incomes. In the sequel, focus is put on distribution with
same median.
4Proof.
(ı) Let us use a discrete notation, that is, a population of n individuals and a rank-





















where yM stand for the median of the distribution. Assume a right-hand-side-Pigou-Dalton
transfer valued to be δ > 0 from individual in to individual in−1 > 0.5 such as in = in−1+γ,
γ > 0. If P+ weakly respects the (PD) principle, then the bi-polarization index before































































Divide both sides by
γ
n and let γ → 0, hence: v
(1)
+ (·) ≤ 0.
(ıı) Imagine a left-hand-side-Pigou-Dalton transfer valued to be δ > 0 from individual

































































Divide both sides by
γ
n and let γ → 0, thus v
(1)
− (·) ≥ 0.
5It then follows that all indices P(·) ∈ Ω1 satisfying (PD) are in the following set:
Ω2 :=

   









− (p) ≥ 0 is continuous and diﬀerentiable
almost everywhere ∀p ∈ [0,0.5[
v
(1)
+ (p) ≤ 0 is continuous and diﬀerentiable
almost everywhere ∀p ∈]0.5,1]

   
   
.
Now, in order to provide more structure to our index, that is, to include more norma-
tive judgments about transfers between agents and how the individual behind the veil of
ignorance may react according to a large spectrum of transfers, we require the following
deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 3.1 The left (right) variation of bi-polarization induced by a progressive Pigou-
Dalton transfer valued to be δ > 0 from the person at rank p + γ, γ > 0 to the one at rank
p is expressed as, respectively:
∆p,γP− (δ,Φ) := P−(e Φ) − P−(Φ), for all p ∈ [0,0.5[
∆p,γP+ (δ,Φ) := P+(e Φ) − P+(Φ), for all p ∈]0.5,1].
Principle 3.3 Principle of 1st-degree Positional Transfer Sensitivity (PTS1). If
e Φ is obtained by a left-hand side (right-hand side) Pigou-Dalton transfer valued to be δ > 0
occurring from a higher-income person to a lower-income one, with a given proportion of
the population between them, then it is more valuable when it takes place near the median
rather than at the tails of the distribution, respectively:
∆p,γP− (δ,Φ) ≤ ∆p0,γP− (δ,Φ),∀p0 > p, for all p,p0 ∈ [0,0.5[ (PTS1−)
∆p,γP+ (δ,Φ) ≥ ∆p0,γP+ (δ,Φ),∀p0 > p, for all p,p0 ∈]0.5,1]. (PTS1+)
A bi-polarization index weakly satisﬁes (PTS1) if
P(e Φ) ≥ P (Φ) ,
(ı) when the positional transfer sensitivity occurs on the left-hand side of the median ;
(ıı) or the positional transfer sensitivity occurs on the right-hand side of the median ;
(ııı) or both positional transfers occur (on the left and on the right).
Lemma 3.2 For all P (Φ) ∈ Ω2, if P (Φ) weakly satisﬁes (PTS1), then
(ı) v
(2)
− (p) ≥ 0 for all p ∈ [0,0.5[
(ıı) v
(2)
+ (p) ≥ 0 for all p ∈]0.5,1].
6Proof.
(ı) Let us assume a right-hand side Pigou-Dalton transfer valued to be δ > 0 at the lower
part of the y+ distribution: from individual ih to individual ih−1 such as ih = ih−1+γ > 0.5,
γ > 0 and another Pigou-Dalton transfer valued to be δ > 0 at the upper part of the y+
distribution: from individual in to individual in−1 such as in = in−1 + γ > 0.5, γ > 0. If
P weakly respects the (PTS1+) principle, then the bi-polarization variation resulting from
the right-hand side (PD) transfer at the lower part of the distribution y+ must be higher
than that resulting from the transfer at the upper part of that distribution:

y+






























































































































Divide both side by
γ



































Divide both side by
β
n and let β → 0, thus v
(2)
+ (·) ≥ 0, for all p ∈]0.5,1].
(ıı) The same reasoning applies. Let us now assume a left-hand side Pigou-Dalton
transfer valued to be δ > 0 at the lower part of the y− distribution: from individual i` to
individual i`−1 such as i` = i`−1 +γ < 0.5, γ > 0 and another Pigou-Dalton transfer valued
to be δ > 0 at the upper part of the y− distribution: from individual iu to individual iu−1
such as iu = iu−1 + γ < 0.5, γ > 0. If P weakly respects the (PTS1−) principle, then the
bi-polarization variation resulting from the left-hand side (PD) transfer at the upper part




































































































































Divide both side by
γ



































Divide both side by τ
n and let τ → 0, thus v
(2)
− (·) ≥ 0, for all p ∈ [0,0.5[.
In order to impose much more structure on the bi-polarization index let us expose the
generalized Positional Principle of Transfer Sensitivity (see Aaberge, 2009), which is a gen-
eralization of Mehran’s (1976) and Kakwani’s (1980) princilpe of transfers (they introduced
this principle building on Kolm’s diminishing transfer principle, 1976, based on “utilitarian”
social welfare functions). In welfare theory, we assume there is a positive welfare variation
at the bottom of the distribution coupled with a negative welfare variation at the top, such
as the overall welfare variation remains positive. Imagine the variation is lower and lower
in taking (positive) variations of (positive) variations, and so on:
∆2
p,Γ2P (δ,Φ) := ∆p+γ2,γ1P (δ,Φ) − ∆p,γ1P (δ,Φ), (4)
where Γ2 = (γ1,γ2), γi > 0,
8. . .
∆s
p,ΓsP (δ,Φ) := ∆s−1
p+γs,Γs−1P (δ,Φ) − ∆s−1
p,Γs−1P (δ,Φ), (5)
where Γs = (γ1,γ2,...,γs), γi > 0. If we now imagine that this generalized principle is
applied to the left-hand side of the distribution and to the right-hand side, we get:
Principle 3.4 Principle of sth-degree Positional Transfer Sensitivity (PTSs). If
e Φ is issued from either a right-hand side (PTSs) implying that
∆s
p,ΓsP+ (δ,Φ) ≥ ∆s
p0,ΓsP+ (δ,Φ), ∀p0 > p (PTSs+)
or/and a left-hand side (PTSs) implying that
∆s
p,ΓsP− (δ,Φ) ≤ ∆s
p0,ΓsP− (δ,Φ), ∀p0 > p (PTSs−)
then, a bi-polarization index P(Φ) satisﬁes this Principle when
P(e Φ) ≥ P (Φ).
Lemma 3.3 For all P (Φ) ∈ Ω2 for which v(`)(·) ∀` ∈ {1,2,...,s} is continuous and
diﬀerentiable over [0,0.5[∪]0.5,1] almost everywhere, if P (Φ) weakly satisﬁes (PTSs), then:
(ı) v
(`+1)
− (p) ≥ 0
(ıı) (−1)`+1v
(`+1)
+ (p) ≥ 0.
Proof.
See the appendix.
In order to recap about our entire class of rank-dependent bi-polarization indices char-
acterized by the generalized positional transfer sensitivity, we deﬁne the following set:
Ωs :=

   







v− (p) is continuous and s-time diﬀerentiable almost everywhere
∀p ∈ [0,0.5[ such as v
(`)
− (p) ≥ 0 ∀` = 1,2,...,s − 1
v+(p) is continuous and s-time diﬀerentiable almost everywhere
∀p ∈]0.5,1] such as(−1)
` v
(`)
+ (p) ≥ 0 ∀` = 1,2,...,s − 1

   
   
.
The use of Ωs is crucial to match the ethical principles introduced supra. Finally,
P (Φ) ∈ Ω1 satisﬁes the Pen Parade Principle, P (Φ) ∈ Ω2 ⊂ Ω1 also satisﬁes the Pigou-
Dalton Principle of Transfers, P (Φ) ∈ Ω3 ⊂ Ω2 ⊂ Ω1 also satisﬁes the Principle of 1st-
degree Positional Transfer Sensitivity and P (Φ) ∈ Ωs ⊂ Ωs−1 ⊂ ··· ⊂ Ω3 ⊂ Ω2 ⊂ Ω1 for all
s ∈ {3,4,...}, also satisﬁes the Principle of (s−2)th-degree Positional Transfer Sensitivity.









− (0) = 0, ∀` = 0,1,2,...,s − 1
v
(`)
+ (1) = 0, ∀` = 0,1,2,...,s − 1
)
. (6)
94 Bi-Polarization-Reducing Tax Reforms
This Section aims at gauging the impact of tax reforms à la Sandmo-Yitzhaki. Accordingly,
the decision maker plans simultaneously a decreasing tax on commodity i and an increasing
tax on commodity j, subject to a constant budget constraint. This marginal tax reform








Following Besley and Kanbur (1988) and Yitzhaki and Slemrod (1991), we use Roy’s identity
with the vector of reference prices sets to actual prices to assess the change in the equivalent
income induced by a marginal change in the tax rate of good i. This change is:
∂Φ(p)
∂ti
= −xi (p), (8)
where xi (p) is the Marshallian demand of good i of the individual at rank p in the income
distribution. Let M be the number of goods, m ∈ {1,2,...,M}. Suppose a constant average
tax revenue, dR = 0, where R =
PM
m=1 tmXm and where Xm is the average consumption of
the m-th commodity: Xm =
R 1





















Wildasin (1984) interprets α as the diﬀerential eﬃciency cost of raising one dollar of public
funds by taxing the j-th commodity and using the proceeds to subsidize the i-th commodity.













Xi for p ∈ [0,0.5[
xi(p)−xi(0.5)
Xi for p ∈]0.5,1]
. (11)
It is simply the distance between the coordinate of the usual concentration curve of order
1 at point p, that is xi(p)/Xi, to its coordinate at the median.3 Integrating successively s













i (u)du for p ∈]0.5,1]
. (12)
3The diﬀerent order of concentration curves were introduced by Makdissi and Mussard (2008a, 2008b).
10Therefore, the variation of bi-polarization induced by an indirect tax reform is:









This leads to our ﬁrst result:






implies dP (Φ) ≤ 0 for all P (Φ) ∈ Ωs if, and only if:
Cs
i (p) − αCs
j (p) ≤ 0 ∀p ∈ [0,1],s ∈ {1,2,3,...}. (14)
Proof.
(Suﬃciency). The proof goes along the lines of Makdissi and Mussard (2008a) in the
case of rank-dependent social welfare functions, but additional restrictions are needed.
∗ order s = 1: From (13), we immediately check that the condition holds since v (p) is
nonnegative and that dti is negative.
∗ order s ∈ {2,3,...}: Let ﬁrst rewrite
R 1
0 C1
























By deﬁnition v−(0) = 0 and C2






















Integrating by parts equation (17) and keeping in mind that v
(s−3)
− (0) = 0 and Cs−1
k (0.5) =
0, we get : Z 0.5
0
C1







Equation (16) respects the relation depicted in equation (17). We have shown that if
equation (17) is true then equation (18) is also true. This implies that equation (18) is true



















11By deﬁnition v+(1) = 0 and C2























Integrating by parts equation (21) and keeping in mind that v
(s−3)
+ (1) = 0 and Cs−1
k (0.5) =
0, we get : Z 1
0.5
C1







Equation (20) respects the relation depicted in equation (21). We have shown that if
equation (21) is true then equation (22) is also true. This implies that equation (22) is true
for all integers s ∈ {2,3,...}.
From equations (13), (18) and (22), we obtain for s ∈ {2,3,...}:

























From the set Ωs, remember that for p ∈ [0,0.5[, v
(`)
− (p) ≥ 0 and that for p ∈]0.5,1],
(−1)`v
(`)
+ (p) ≥ 0 ∀` ∈ {1,2,...,s − 1} and that dti < 0. Therefore, a suﬃcient condition
for dP (Φ) ≤ 0 is Cs
i (p) − αCs
j (p) ≤ 0 for all p ∈ [0,1].
(Necessity). Consider the set of functions P (Φ) ∈ e Ωs for which the (s − 2)th derivative







0 p ≤ p
p − p p < p ≤ p + 
 p +  < p < 0.5
, (24)
for some p ∈ [0,0.5[ and v
(s−1)
+ (p) =  for p > 0.5. Since v− (p) is diﬀerentiable almost every-
where except at p and p + , it satisﬁes the conditions in (6). Thus, bi-polarization indices
whose frequency distortion functions v− (p) have the particular above form for v
(s−2)
− (p)







0 p ≤ p
1 p < p ≤ p + 
0 p > p + 
. (25)
12Imagine now that Cs
i (p) − αCs
j (p) > 0 on an interval [p,p + ] for  that can be arbitrarily
close to 0. For v− (p) deﬁned as in (24), expression (23) is then positive and the marginal
tax reform induces a marginal increase in bi-polarization.
Consider now the set of functions P (Φ) ∈ e Ωs for which the (s − 2)th derivative of v+ (p)
is such that v
(s−1)








s−1  0.5 < p ≤ p
(−1)
s−1 (p +  − p) p < p ≤ p + 
0 p > p + 
, (26)
for some p ∈]0.5,1]. Since v+ (p) is diﬀerentiable almost everywhere except at p and p + ,
it satisﬁes the conditions in (6). Thus, polarization indices whose frequency distortion
functions v+ (p) have the particular above form for v
(s−1)







0 p ≤ p
(−1)
s p < p ≤ p + 
0 p > p + 
. (27)
Imagine now that Cs
i (p) − αCs
j (p) > 0 on an interval [p,p + ] for  that can be arbitrarily
close to 0. For v+ (p) deﬁned as in (26), expression (23) is then positive and the marginal
tax reform induces a marginal increase in bi-polarization. Hence, it cannot be that Cs
i (p)−
αCs
j (p) > 0 for p ∈ [p,p + ].
This result states that a marginal tax reform increasing the tax on the j-th good and de-
creasing the tax on the i-th good produces a decrease of bi-polarization if the bi-polarization
curve of order s of good j (multiplied by α) lies nowhere below that of good i. Furthermore,
this test enables bi-polarization-reducing tax reform to be implemented in being aware of
the behavior of the decision maker since each order s corresponds to a precise ethical trans-
fer principle. Indeed, as far as s increases, the decision maker is more and more averse to
rank dependent bi-polarization.
5 Application
In this section we perform double (left hand side plus right hand side) inverse stochastic
dominance tests in order to identify marginal tax reforms for which the reduction of po-
larization is possible. We use the Jordanian Household Expenditure and Income Survey
2002/2003. Using a sample of 9,999 households, we investigate many commodity marginal
tax reforms. The pairs of commodity on which tax polices are applied are the following:
expenses in transport and communication versus education and transport (and communi-
cation) versus medical care.
13In order to capture simple marginal tax reforms, we use α = 1, that is a reform associated
with neither eﬃciency gain nor eﬃciency loss for the government, that is, the ratio between
each marginal social cost of funds is valued to be one.
The boundary of α is crutial. As Yitzhaki and Slemrod (1991) pointed out, α < 1
(α > 1) indicates, as a consequence of the tax reform, whether a diminution (a rise) of
the excess burden occurs. Referring to Duclos, Makdissi and Wodon (2008) in the case
of welfare-improving tax reforms, a wide range of eﬃciency parameters are operational.
Nevertheless, in general, welfare indices being rank-dependent cannot be neither Pen im-
proving, nor Dalton improving, nor Positional improving (for all orders) if α > 1. Then,
welfare-improving tax reforms are usually associated with α ≤ 1. The same result holds for
bi-polarization.
In Figure 1, we expose a second-order inverse dominance test between transport and
education. As can be seen, this second-order test does not allow for demonstrating that
bi-polarization indices P(·) ∈ Ω2 decreases when the decision maker marginally increases
the tax on transport (and communication) and uses the proceed to decrease the tax on
education. This is because the s−curves of order 2 cross on the right-hand side of the
median.
[Figure 1]
On the contrary, if we suppose that the decision maker is more averse to bi-polarization,
e.g, we make the same test at the order 3, then the s−curves do not cross as depicted
in Figure 2. In this respect, if s = 3 bi-polarization decreases when the decision maker
marginally decreases the tax on education, this tax being ﬁnanced by a increasing tax on
transport (and communication), the budget neutrality being respected.
[Figure 2]
The same reasoning applies for transport (increasing tax) and medical care (decreasing




Proof of Lemma 3.3:
From lemma 3.2, (PST1−) implies v
(2)
− (p) ≥ 0 and (PST1+) implies v
(2)
+ (p) ≥ 0. We just
show that (PST2−) implies v
(3)
− (p) ≥ 0 since higher order may be obtained using an induc-
tion reasonning.
Imagine a (PD) transfer in the tail of y− valued to be δ from y−
i`−1 to y−
i`−2 coupled with
another (PD) transfer valued to be δ from y−
i` to y−
i`+1, namely a favorable composite trans-
fer(since it decreases polarization). We compare this favorable composite transfer with
another one near the median (valued to be δ) from y−
iu−1 to y−
iu−2 and from y−
iu to y−
iu+1.




































































































Divide both sides of the last expression by τ
n and let τ → 0:
v
(3)
− (·) ≥ 0.
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